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“Decades

of lies and intimidation could not make
the Iraqi people love their oppressors or desire
their own enslavement.”1
-President George W. Bush, May 1, 2003
I. INTRODUCTION

Although he Bush administration began Operation Iraqi Freedom with
the pretext of searching for weapons of mass destruction,2 the operation
ultimately liberated a nation that spent decades under a dictatorial regime. For
at least the past twenty to thirty years, the Iraqi people,3 including the Kurds,
lived as victims of their own government. Saddam Hussein and his regime
victimized the Iraqi people through torture, execution, and deportation. As
President Bush stated in his address on May 1, 2003, America is “pursuing and
finding leaders of the old regime, who will be held to account for their

1

President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation (May 1, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/iraq/20030501-15.html (last visited April
7, 2004).
2
The Bush administration has yet to find any weapons of mass destruction. The
Gospel According to George, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 26, 2004, at 18. Nevertheless, a number of
views emerged about Bush’s policy even before that admission. See Ivan Eland, Symposium,
What Should the United States Do About Saddam Hussein?, 50 EMORY L.J. 833, 853 (2001)
(“Despite the conduct of a wise, restrained military policy during the first 165 years of the
nation's history, the aberration of more than fifty years of Cold War and post-Cold War U.S.
interventionism now seems like the norm and has led U.S. presidents to become arrogant in
their exercise of U.S. military power overseas. George W. Bush has promised the American
public a more "humble" foreign policy. Let it begin with U.S. policy toward Iraq.”); Norman
G. Printer, Jr., Deterring Saddam Hussein: Between Iraq and a Hard Place, 30 S.U. L. Rev. 85,
97 (2003) (The current Bush Administration urged the Council to adopt smart sanctions that
would have reduced the number of dual-use items and expanded the number of humanitarian
items, while offering incentives and disincentives to Iraq's neighbors aimed at stifling
smuggling.”).
3 An initial, but imperative distinction exists between “Iraq” as the Arab Ba’ath
Socialist Party led by Saddam Hussein and “Iraq” as the Iraqi people. The Security Council’s
use of “Iraq” in Resolutions 1441 and 688 targeted only Saddam Hussein and his regime. In
2002, the United Nations Security Council issued Resolution 1441 which stipulated that Iraq
“has been and remains in material breach of its obligations,” but extended it a “final
opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations.” S.C. Res. 1441, U.N. SCOR, 57th
Sess., 4644th mtg. at 3, 5, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1441 (2002). The Security Council referenced
Resolution 688, S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/688v
(1991), which demanded Iraq “immediately end” the “repression of the Iraqi civilian
population, and allow organizations providing humanitarian relief to aid those needing help.”
Id. In closing, the Resolution warned Iraq that it would “face serious consequences” if it
continued to violate its obligations. Id. For more information on the use of force under the
authority of the United Nations Security Council, see Patrick McLain, Note, Settling the Score
with Saddam: Resolution 1441 and Parallel Justifications for the Use of Force Against Iraq,
13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 233, 241 (2003); Printer, supra note 2.

2

crimes.”4 After United States troops captured Hussein on December 13, 2003,5
President Bush declared, “now the former director of Iraq will face the justice
he denied to millions.”6
On January 9, 2004, the United States officially declared Saddam
Hussein a prisoner of war and indicated that it will turn him over to a special
court established by the Iraqi Governing Council under the direction of the
Coalition Provisional Authority.7 Yet, prosecution in this forum fails to ensure
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as required by Article 14 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and does not prohibit the
death penalty. Further, such prosecution requires the application of Iraqi
criminal law and procedure where otherwise unarticulated in the statute
creating it.8 This might allow Hussein to twist the laws he implemented to his
advantage. Consequently, this Article focuses on alternative fora for
jurisdiction over Hussein, recommends an ad hoc international criminal
tribunal that does not provide for the death penalty, and examines Hussein’s
liability for genocide against the Kurds and crimes against humanity.
This Article will explore and catalogue the international case against
Hussein for injuries inflicted on the Iraqis and the Kurds before the war began.
Although the focus will remain primarily on Saddam Hussein, much of the
rationale also applies to other regime participants. Part II begins with a
historical overview of the Iraqi peoples’ oppression and focuses on the
consequences of Hussein’s decisions and orders. Part III reviews different
jurisdictional options including a national trial by Iraq, prosecution in the
United States, the International Criminal Court, and an international ad hoc
tribunal akin to those established in Rwanda and Yugoslavia. This Part
ultimately recommends that Hussein’s prosecution take place in an
international ad hoc tribunal situated in Iraq. The Security Council, under its
Chapter VII authority, may establish an ad hoc criminal tribunal to prosecute
Hussein for committing or participating in crimes against humanity and
genocide. Part IV discusses Iraq’s international legal obligations including
treaties and United Nations membership requirements. Part V examines the
legal ramifications of Hussein’s genocide campaign against the Kurds and
applies the relevant elements to Hussein’s actions. It also addresses the limited
4

President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation (May 1, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/iraq/20030501-15.html (last visited April
7, 2004).
5
Prior to his capture, a number of scholars debated the merits of forcible abduction.
See Louis R. Beres, Why and How Saddam Must be Punished: A Jurisprudential/Philosophic
Explanation, 78 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 667 (1998).
6
President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on the Capture of Saddam
Hussein
(Dec.
14,
2003),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031214-3.html (last visited Jan. 19,
2004).
7
Saddam Hussein as a P.O.W.: Q & A on the Prisoner-of-War Status of Saddam
Hussein,
HUMAN
RIGHTS
NEWS,
Jan.
22,
2004,
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/01/27/iraq7076.htm#5 (last visited Feb. 15, 2004).
8
Id.
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arguments that Hussein’s defense counsel could raise. Part VI applies
international principles concerning crimes against humanity to Saddam
Hussein’s most flagrant crimes against the Iraqi citizens.9
II. A HISTORY OF OPPRESSION
Formerly part of the Ottoman Empire, Iraq obtained its independence
from British occupation in 1932. Several ethnic groups comprise Iraq’s total
population of 24,683,313: Arabs form 75% to 80% of the population; Kurds
comprise 15% to 20% of the population, and Turkomans and Assyrians make
up the remainder of the population.10 The Kurds have occupied the northern
mountainous regions of Iraq since the 12th century when the world referred to
the region as “Kurdistan.”11 Because the Kurds lived in the mountains,
separated from the main cities in Iraq, they developed their own distinct culture
and language. Despite their geographical and cultural separation, the Kurds did
not enjoy political independence. From the 16th to early 20th century, the
Ottoman and Persian Empires ruled the Kurds.12 Although the Kurds briefly
experienced a year of independence in 1946 by forming their own republic, the
Iraqi regime controlled Kurdish territory for the vast majority of the 20th
century.13 Since the 1920s, the Kurds have struggled for independence by
staging various unsuccessful revolts.14 These revolts led to Iraqi government
attempts to quash the rebellion and ultimately exterminate the Kurds through
the Anfal campaigns.
A. The Anfal Campaigns
Iraqis used the name Anfal, or “the spoils,” to refer to a series of staged
military actions against the Kurds of northern Iraq. The Ba’ath Party formed a
complex power structure; full comprehension of Hussein’s control of the antiKurdish campaigns requires a basic grasp of its components. The highest
9

Although evidence of war crimes also exists, any discussion of past or future war
crimes is beyond the scope of this Article. Adjudication of these war crimes would require
separate consideration of jurisdictional issues to address Iraq’s counter-allegations against the
United States. For more information about past war crimes committed by Iraq, see James S.
Robbins, War Crimes: The Case of Iraq, 18 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 45 (1994); Kenneth A.
Williams, The Iraq-Kuwait Crisis: An Analysis of the Unresolved Issue of War Crimes
Liability, 18 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 385 (1992).
10
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK (2003), available at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2004). These groups speak
Arabic, Kurdish, Assyrian, and Armenian.
11
MIDDLE EAST WATCH, GENOCIDE IN IRAQ 23 (1993) (citing P. J. BRAIDWOOD,
PREHISTORIC INVESTIGATION IN IRAQI KURDISTAN (1960)).
12
Id. at 24.
13
Id. at 24-26.
14
Id. at 24. The Kurds have also fought against one another because of ideological
and personal dissension. Although they united briefly after the first Gulf War, division and
conflict quickly reappeared. Gavin A. Symes, Note, Force Without Law: Seeking A Legal
Justification for the September 1996 U.S. Military Intervention in Iraq, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L.
581, 585 (1998).
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executive body was the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) over which
Hussein exercised ultimate power as Chairman.15 The RCC controlled a
number of regionally based committees including the Northern Affairs
Committee where Hussein served as secretary until around 1970. He
eventually delegated that power to his cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid.16 Prior to
Hussein’s rise to dictator, he served as the RCC member in charge of “Kurdish
affairs.”17 Before he went into hiding, Saddam Hussein also served as the
commander-in-chief for the armed forces, President of the Republic of Iraq,
and Secretary General of the Ba’ath Party.
In May of 1992 and March of 1993, Human Rights Watch, an
international human rights organization, facilitated the shipment of eighteen
tons of official Iraqi government documents to the United States. The Kurds
uncovered these documents during their 1991 uprising. The prosecutor in
Saddam Hussein’s trial may rely on these documents as evidence of Hussein’s
participation and oversight of the campaign against the Kurds. Other evidence
might consist of eyewitness accounts and forensic evidence obtained by the
Middle East Watch in collaboration with Physicians for Human Rights. The
Kurds recovered the majority of the following accounts and documents from
the offices of Iraq’s internal intelligence agency, the General Security
Directorate (“secret police”).
The plight of the Kurds at the hands of Hussein’s regime began well
before the first Gulf War. Beginning in 1985, Hussein’s plan to address
“Kurdish affairs” formed a systematic program of destruction for Kurdish
villages through chemical weapons and military force, subsequent relocation of
the Kurds in concentration camps, and summary executions upon arrival. In
1988, Iraqi forces killed as many as 182,000 Kurds and destroyed at least
4,000 Kurdish villages.18
Until 1988, no government had ever used chemical weapons against its
own people.19 Governments may not use chemical weapons under any
circumstances.20 Yet, Hussein’s regime used mustard and nerve gas against at
15

HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GENOCIDE IN IRAQ: THE ANFAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE
KURDS 76 n.37 (1993). The RCC forcibly returned to power in 1968. The chairman of the
RCC was the “president of the republic . . . . the supreme organ of the state, charged with the
mission of carrying out the popular will by removing from power the reactionary, the
dictatorial, and the corrupt elements of society and by returning power to the people.”
Catherine S. Knowles, Life and Human Dignity, the Birthright of All Human Beings: An
Analysis of the Iraqi Genocide of the Kurds and Effective Enforcement of Human Rights, 45
NAVAL L. REV. 152, 152, 155-56 (1998) (citing MIDDLE EAST WATCH, supra note 11, at 25).
16
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 15, at 76 n.37.
17
Id. at 33.
18
STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 102D CONG., 1ST SESS, STAFF
REPORT ON KURDISTAN IN THE TIME OF SADDAM HUSSEIN 56 (Comm. Print 1991) (primarily
authored by Peter W. Galbraith); see also GERARD CHALIAND, THE KURDISH TRAGEDY 3
(1994).
19
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 15, at 61.
20
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and Their Destruction, opened for signature Jan. 13, 1993, U.N.
GAOR, 47th Sess., Supp. No. 27, U.N. Doc. A/47/27, App. I (1992), reprinted in SHADOW
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least sixty villages and the town Halabja. This offensive aimed to terrorize the
Kurdish civilian population, flush villagers from their homes, and ultimately
capture, relocate, and kill them.21 The gas attack in Halabja alone killed 5,000
people and prompted approximately 80,000 people to flee to Iran.22 One
survivor of a chemical attack on Birjinni stated that he observed, “‘white, black
and then yellow [clouds of smoke], rising about fifty or sixty yards into the air
in a column. Then the column began to break up and drift. It drifted down into
the valley and then passed through the village. Then we smelled the gas.’”23 At
first, “‘it smelled of apples and something sweet,’” but then “‘it became
bitter.’”24 As a result of the attacks, those exposed to the gases experienced
vomiting, blindness, and painful swellings under their arms.25
Once it finished using chemical and conventional bombing, the army
and domestic militia dynamited and bulldozed Kurdish villages.26 The Iraqi
army destroyed at least 703 Kurdish villages in 1987 alone.27 After the armies
razed the village of Serkand Khailani, officials arrested most of the villagers
and later subjected the leaders to beatings with cables, suspensions from
ceiling hooks, and electric shocks to the earlobes.28 Some of those arrested
were executed.29 Others were sent to the collective camps.30 The Iraqi
government painstakingly videotaped and documented a number of these
events.31
To serve as a lesson to others, President Hussein approved a special
plan for dealing with Kurds in the Marsh areas.32 The plan entailed poisoning,
bombing, and burning the homes of friends and relatives of subversives in the

SUBSTANCE: THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION 307 (Benoit Morel & Kyle Olson
eds., 1993).
21
The Human Rights Watch has cataloged the forty known attacks. HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH, supra note 15, at 360-63.
22
International Federation for Human Rights, Report on Iraq: Continuous and Silent
Ethnic Cleansing, Displaced Persons in Iraqi Kurdistan and Iraqi Refugees in Iran, at 7
(January, 2003), available at http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/iq350a.pdf (last visited April 7,
2004).
23
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 15, at 270.
24
Id.; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ENDLESS TORMENT: THE 1991 UPRISING IN
IRAQ
AND
ITS
AFTERMATH,
at
n.8
(1992),
available
at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/Iraq926.htm (last visited, Feb. 22, 2004).
25
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 15, at 62.
26
Id. at 107.
27
Id. at 73.
28
Id. at 325.
29
Id.
30
International Federation for Human Rights, supra note 22, at 6.
31
See, e.g., U.N. Special Rapporteur’s Report, E/CN.4/1993/45 (Feb. 19, 1993). This
report contains a document marked confidential and personal that gives instructions for
carrying out the demolition of villages.
32
IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY AND THE TRANSITION
FROM DICTATORSHIP TO DEMOCRACY 146 (1993); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ENDLESS
TORMENT: THE 1991 UPRISING IN IRAQ AND ITS AFTERMATH (1992), available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1992/Iraq926.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2004).
AND
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Marsh areas.33 It also included an economic blockade to more efficiently
“‘limit provision of their daily living needs’” by diminishing food supplies,
banning fish sales, and banning goods.34 To date, no official documents have
been found concerning these camps. However, various agencies recorded
testimony of the incarcerated Kurdish people, and at least one letter from Amn
Suleimaniyeh35 to the director of security of the Autonomous Region exists.36
This letter documents the execution of nineteen people for “being found in
prohibited areas” and forty-seven for being “subversives sentenced to death by
the Revolutionary Court.”37 It also notes the deportation of 9,030 people sent
to the “Popular Army camp in the governate of al-Ta’mim.”38
Interviews with survivors revealed the conditions and treatment at the
camps. Upon arrival, guards divided men and women into separate camps and
body searched them.39 One man, after being beaten with sticks and electric
cables, was hung from a ceiling fan and scorched with hot steel.40 Prisoners
used cans for bowel movements, ate soup filled with leftover bones and oil,
and often received no food at all.41
Convoys carried the Kurds from the camps out into the country for
execution by firing squad.42 At least six people survived.43 One of the
survivors stated: “[i]n place of the handcuffs, the guards used a length of string
to tie the twenty-eight prisoners in a single line by their left hands. The men
were ordered to stand facing a freshly dug trench, just long enough to
accommodate the twenty-eight bodies as they fell.”44 A gravedigger working in
the Kurdish area of Northern Iraq stated, “‘I must have buried 600 or maybe up
to 1,000 people—all killed by the secret police between 1985 and 1989.
Sometimes they were peshmerga, sometimes women, sometimes children.
Sometimes they’d been tortured.’”45
A number of government documents prohibiting human life in
designated areas of the Kurdish countryside confirm the truth behind these
statements. Hussein’s cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid signed one personal
directive, numbered 28/3650, which stated “[w]ithin their jurisdiction, the
33

IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS, supra note 32, at 146.
Id.
35
Iraqi headquarters in the city of Suleimaniyeh.
36
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/MIDDLE EAST, supra note Error! Bookmark
defined., at 141-42.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 15, at 213, available
http://hrw.org/reports/1993/iraqanfal/ANFAL8.htm (last visited February 17, 2004).
40
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/MIDDLE EAST, supra note Error! Bookmark
defined., at 145-47.
41
Id. at 144.
42
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/MIDDLE EAST, supra note Error! Bookmark
defined., at 160-61.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 161.
45
IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS, supra note 32, at 30. Peshmerga are “those who
death,” namely Kurdish fighters. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 15, at 370.
34
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not

at
not

not

face

armed forces must kill any human being or animal present within these areas.
They are totally prohibited.”46 Hussein also targeted Shi’a Muslims after the
March 1991 uprising, where he publicly stated that the participating Shi’a
Muslims should be shot for treason.47 Even before these directives, guards shot
around 150 men and boys at al-Mahawil Garrison.48 Guards threw others from
the top floor of a hospital, drowned them, dragged them through the streets, or
left them hanging from electricity poles to terrorize the locals.49 In their
attempts to retake the cities involved in the 1991 uprising, loyalist forces used
helicopters to attack unarmed civilians, arrested or shot civilians without
charge, and executed young men in the streets and in hospitals.50
In 1998, the New York Times reported that Hussein executed at least
1,500 people in one year for “political reasons.”51 Hussein’s son, Qusay
Hussein, ordered the executions as part of a prison-cleansing campaign. The
Husseins then required the family members of the executed prisoners to pay
for the bullets before they could claim and bury the bodies.52 In many ways,
the methodical calculation of costs and benefits without regard for human
dignity resembles that of Adolph Hitler in ordering the extermination of the
Jews. Hussein’s method of conducting the Anfal campaigns by defining the
Kurds as the target, concentrating them in one area, and executing them fits the
pattern used by the Nazis.53
B. Alternative “Justice”
1. A Lack of Judicial Process
Hussein did not, however, limit his disregard for human life to the
Kurds. He established a court system for all Iraqis that provided few
opportunities for fair hearings and multiple occasions for excessive
punishment. Trials in Iraq were often conducted before “special courts” and
were always conducted in camera.54 Hussein employed military officers and
civil servants who lacked judicial training and the autonomy necessary to make
impartial judgments.55 The regime sometimes restricted aid from attorneys or
46

Id. at 79-80.
Amnesty International, Human Rights Committee Briefing, AI Index MDE
14/08/97, at 7 (Oct. 8, 1997).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 32.
51
HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT:
LAW, POLITICS, MORALS 14 (2d ed. 2000) (quoting Barbara Crossett, 1,500 Executions Cited
for Iraq in Past Year, Mostly for Politics, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1998, at A1).
52
Id.
53
See generally RAUL HILBERG, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE EUROPEAN JEWS 267
(1985).
54
Amnesty International Report 2002, Iraq 1-3 (2002).
55
Id.
47
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government-appointed lawyers to the actual trial date.56 In April of 2001, a
“special court” sentenced four people to life in prison for simply “attempting to
form a political grouping.”57
The Iraqi government frequently arrested both the people suspected of
anti-government activities and their families.58 Officials arrested a retired
medical doctor and his brother-in-law in March of 2001 simply to pressure his
wife, also a doctor, to return to Iraq.59 On July 26, 2002, several of the United
Nations special rapporteurs addressed a letter to the Iraqi government
requesting information on two individuals who reportedly engaged in “terrorist
acts” inside Iraq.60 The letter stated, “it is feared that their confessions [on
national television] may have been extracted under duress and that televised
statements may have an impact upon the fairness of their trial.” 61 The
Rapporteurs expressed further concern that the men were “at risk of being
sentenced to death and executed.”62 They received no response. The Report
also stated that no positive developments occurred in relation to missing
persons.63
2. Punishments
On June 5, 1994, Iraq’s highest executive body, the Revolutionary
Command Council (RCC) published a series of decrees in the official Iraqi
newspaper, Al-Jumhuriya, which required amputations and brandings as
punishments for at least 30 crimes.64 Saddam Hussein signed each of the
decrees in his position as Chairman of the RCC.65 In 2000, Hussein and his
officials reportedly began using tongue amputation to punish people who
criticized him or his family.66 Guards allegedly performed such an amputation
on July 17, 2000 in front of a large crowd.67 Hussein’s decrees prescribed the
death penalty for car theft, counterfeiting, smuggling cars or drilling machines,
56

Id.
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Human Rights Questions: Human Rights Situations and Reports of Special
Rapporteurs and Representatives: Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, U.N. GAOR, 57th Sess.,
Agenda Item 111 (c), at 8, U.N. Doc. A/57/325 (2002). The reports came from the United
Nations Special Rapporteur on the Commission on Human Rights, along with the Rapporteur
on Torture and the Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Human Rights Questions: Human Rights Situations and Reports of Special
Rapporteurs and Representatives: Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess.,
Annex, Agenda Item 100, at 44-59, U.N. Doc. A/49/651 (1994).
65
Id. at 44-59.
66
Bureau Of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports On Human
Rights Practices-Iraq (2002), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2002/18277.htm
(last visited April 7, 2004).
67
Id.
57
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organizing a group of two or more persons for procurement purposes,
falsifying military service documents, and stealing (when committed by a
member of the armed forces or government employee).68
A report by the United Nations’ Special Rapporteur stated that the
government executed forty-three prisoners on February 3, 2000.69 Thirty were
reportedly executed for theft, two for drug trafficking, and eleven for affiliation
with the political opposition.70 In this same report, the Special Rapporteur
stated that he was:
of the opinion that Iraq continues to be in
violation of its obligations under the
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, if only because of the sheer numbers of
executions that are taking place and what appear
to be extrajudicial executions on political
grounds and in the absence of a due process of
law.71
In December of 2000, the United Nations General Assembly issued a
Resolution strongly condemning Saddam Hussein and his government for
“systematic, widespread and extremely grave violations of human rights and of
international humanitarian law.”72 The condemnation extended to suppressions
of fundamental freedoms, the widespread use of the death penalty in violation
of the ICCPR, arbitrary executions, widespread and systematic torture, and the
prescription of cruel and inhuman punishments.73 In his “leadership”
capacities, Hussein committed countless human rights violations.74
Numerous current reports continue to document human rights
violations by Saddam Hussein and Iraqi officials.75 Up until “Operation Iraqi
Freedom,” the United Nations delegated a special rapporteur to report on the
humanitarian situation in Iraq. Unfortunately, this did little to alleviate the
situation.
III. JURISDICTIONAL OPTIONS

68

Id. Hussein personally signed each decree.
Human Rights Questions: Human Rights Situations and Reports of Special
Rapporteurs and Representatives: Situation of Human Rights in Iraq, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess.,
Annex, Agenda Item 116(c), at 12, U.N. Doc. A/55/294 (2000).
70
Id.
71
Id. at 20.
72
G.A. Res. 55/115, U.N. GAOR, 81st Sess., at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/115 (2000).
73
Id.
74
This article will examine only the deportation, imprisonment, severe deprivation of
physical liberties, and torture of the Kurdish population.
75
See, e.g., Amnesty International Report 2002, supra note 54, at 1-3; A Decade Of
Deception And Defiance: Saddam Hussein’s Defiance Of The United Nations 11-17 (2002)
(White House Background Paper) available at http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/13456.htm (last
visited April 7, 2004).
69
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Before reaching the merits of the case, one must consider which courts
could validly exercise jurisdiction over Saddam Hussein’s prosecution. Four
primary potential fora exist: (1) Iraqi national courts, (2) United States federal
courts asserting universal jurisdiction, (3) the International Criminal Court
through special appointment by the Security Council, or (4) an ad hoc tribunal
set up by the United Nations Security Council. The jurisdictional decision will
play a major role in determining both applicable law and procedural
constraints.
A. Trial by the Iraqi Citizens
Since most of Hussein’s crimes occurred in Iraq and against the Iraqi
people, Iraq retains territorial jurisdiction. The accessibility of physical
evidence, victims, and witnesses makes Iraqi courts seem like a sensible
jurisdiction. A trial in Iraq may promote healing and reconciliation for victims
of the regime. However, heads of state, such as Saddam Hussein, may avoid
rigorous prosecution in their own territories by scare tactics, force, and an
ability to manipulate the law. Additionally, it could take a considerable amount
of time for a viable government capable of running the national courts to
emerge. As evidenced by the number of insurgencies in Iraq after the capture
of Hussein, a number of his supporters still exist.
Even with the installation of a new Iraqi government, it could take
years for the government to create a workable court system. Once the new
regime begins, the likelihood of a fair trial by a new government attempting to
purge the old leadership would be slim. Many proposed leaders of the new
government lived in exile under Saddam Hussein’s rule and may view his trial
as a unique opportunity for retaliation. For Hussein to receive the “justice he
denied to millions,”76 a neutral judge, or panel of judges, should preside over
his trial.
B. National Prosecution by the United States
Theoretically, United States courts provide a second option for
prosecution. Domestic courts can invoke universal jurisdiction to prosecute
Iraqi officials.77 Yet, according to the concept of immunity for acts committed
76

President George W. Bush, Address to the Nation on the Capture of Saddam
Hussein
(Dec.
14,
2003),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031214-3.html (last visited Jan. 19,
2004).
77
Until fairly recently, outside states struggled to find a legal justification for
jurisdiction over diplomatic figures, particularly when the international community refused to
act. The Introductory Comment to the Harvard Research Draft Convention on Jurisdiction with
Respect to Crime 1935 listed five general principles, in order of jurisdiction consideration. The
“territorial principle,” determining jurisdiction by reference to the place where the offense was
committed, was of primary importance; the “nationality principle,” determining jurisdiction by
reference to the nationality or national character of the person committing the offense, was also
universally accepted; the “protective principle,” determining jurisdiction by reference to the
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by heads of state while in office, the United States court might find Hussein
substantively liable but procedurally immune.
Under the principle of universal jurisdiction,78 any state, regardless of
its direct involvement in the conflict or offense, may prosecute “certain
offenses recognized by the community of nations as of universal concern, such
national interest injured by the offense, was recognized in most states; the “universality
principle,” determining jurisdiction by reference to the custody of the person committing the
offense, was widely accepted, but not universal; and finally, the “passive personality
principle,” determining jurisdiction by reference to the nationality or national character of the
person injured by the offense, was considered auxiliary in character an probably not essential if
the ends were served by any other principle. D.J. HARRIS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW 264-66 (5th ed. 1998).
The universality principal resembles humani generis theory. Hostes humani generis
means “enemies of the human race.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 742 (7th ed. 1999).
Authorities could apprehend perpetrators who committed acts considered universally
reprehensible wherever they went. The theory originally applied only to pirates. See id.; see
also Edith Y. Wu, Saddam Hussein as Hostes Humani Generis? Should the U.S. Intervene?,
26 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 55, 56 (1998).
78
The Harvard Research Draft Convention proposed universal jurisdiction in the
following situations:
Article 10:
(a) When committed in a place not subject to its
authority but subject to the authority of another state, if the
act or omission which constitutes the crime is also an
offence by the law of the place where it was committed, if
surrender of the alien for prosecution has been offered to
such other state or states and the offer remains unaccepted,
and if prosecution is not barred by lapse of time under the
law of the place where the crime was committed. The
penalty imposed shall in no case be more severe than the
penalty prescribed for the same act or omission by the law
of the place where the crime was committed.
(b) When committed in a place not subject to the
authority of any state, if the act or omission which
constitutes the crime is also an offence by the law of a
state of which the alien is a national, if surrender of the
alien for prosecution remains unaccepted, and if
prosecution is not barred by lapse of time under the law of
a state of which the alien is a national. The penalty
imposed shall in no case be more severe than the penalty
prescribed for the same act or omission by the law of a
state of which the alien is a national.
(c) When committed in a place not subject to the
authority of any state, if the crime was committed to the
injury of the state assuming jurisdiction, or of one of its
nationals, or of a corporation or juristic person having its
national character.
(d) When committed in a place not subject to the
authority of any state and the alien is not a national of any
state.
HARRIS, supra note 77, at 288-89 (internal citations omitted).
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as . . . genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts of terrorism.”79 Behind
the principle of universal jurisdiction lies the theory that genocide, crimes
against humanity, and war crimes not only violate international law but also
offend the whole of humanity.80 Ideally all states would work both collectively
and individually to prosecute violators. Universal jurisdiction invoked by
individual states furthers several important goals: attaining justice for
victims,81 deterring future human rights abuses through public prosecutions of
senior officials,82 demonstrating international concern and collective responses
toward human rights violations,83 and protecting the sanctity of ordered
society.84
A number of treaties concerning drug-trafficking,85 hijacking,86 aircraft
terrorism,87 hostages,88 torture,89 apartheid,90 and attacks on diplomats91
expressly include the right to invoke universal jurisdiction. Universal
jurisdiction endows every state with jurisdiction over a limited category of
crimes such as piracy and slave trading.92 The list of crimes subject to
universal jurisdiction continues to expand.93 As one United States court
79

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 404, 423 (1987).
80
INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, HARD CASES: BRINGING
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATORS TO JUSTICE ABROAD 4-5 (1999).
81
Id. at 9-10.
82
Id. at 11-12.
83
Id. at 16.
84
Id.
85
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, Art. 36(2)(iv), 520 U.N.T.S. 204 (1965); see
also 1988 Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs, Art. 4(2)(b), Misc. 14 (1989);
D.P.P. v. Doot, [1973] A.C. 807, HL (Lord Wilberforce).
86
Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft 1970, Art.
4, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 (1971).
87
Montreal Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Civil Aviation 1971, Art. 5, 10 I.L.M. 1151 (1974).
88
1979 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, Art. 5, 18 I.L.M.
1456, entered into force 1983.
89
1984 United Nations Torture Convention, Art. 5(2), 23 I.L.M. 1027, entered into
force 1987 [hereinafter Torture Convention]; see also Ahcene Boulesbaa, An Analysis of the
1984 Draft Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, 4 DICK. J. INT’L L. 185 (1986).
90
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 1973,
Art. II-IV, 13 I.L.M. 50, entered into force 1976.
91
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons including Diplomats 1973, Art. 2, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167, entered into force
1977.
92
For more information on piracy, see Edwin D. Dickinson, Is the Crime of Piracy
Obsolete?, 38 HARV. L. REV. 334, 335-39 (1925).
93
The list of crimes considered eligible for universal jurisdiction in the United States
constantly expands. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781, 788 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (making several references to domestic jurisdiction over extraterritorial offenses under
the universality principal but ultimately deciding to dismiss the action); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,
630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (likening the defendant, a Paraguayan torturer to pirates and
slave traders, the quintessential defendants eligible for universal jurisdiction); Von Dardel v.
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observed, “nations have begun to extend jurisdiction to . . . crimes considered
in the modern era to be as great a threat to the well-being of the international
community as piracy.”94
Despite an increasing willingness to invoke universal jurisdiction, the
United States must overcome certain procedural hurdles before prosecuting.
United States domestic law includes international law,95 and international law
recognizes universal jurisdiction for certain offenses such as piracy, war
crimes, and genocide.96 However, a person cannot be tried in a United States
federal court for an international crime unless Congress first adopts a statute
defining and punishing the offense.97 For the United States to prosecute
Hussein three things must occur: (1) Congress must have enacted statutes to
punish genocide and crimes against humanity, (2) the prosecutor must avoid
the obstacle of immunity for heads of state, and (3) Colin Powell must deflect
international criticism that prosecution represents the victors’ “justice” for the
vanquished.

Union of Socivet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246, 254 (D.D.C. 1985) (mentioning the
“concept of extraordinary judicial jurisdiction over acts in violation of significant international
standards . . . embodied in the principle of ‘universal’ violations of international law”); In re
Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. 544, 555 (N.D. Ohio 1985) (deciding that Israel’s jurisdiction to
prosecute a guard from a concentration camp “conforms with the international law principle of
universal jurisdiction”), aff’d sub nom, Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); United States v. Layton, 509 F. Supp. 212, 223 (N.D. Cal.
1981) (recognizing universal jurisdiction to punish terrorist acts against internationally
protected persons such as diplomats); William W. Burke-White, Regionalization of
International Criminal Law Enforcement: A Preliminary Exploration, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 729,
732 (discussing the trend toward regional international law enforcement).
94
Layton, 509 F. Supp. at 223.
95
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 667, 712 (1900).
96
Demjanjuk, 776 F.2d at 582.
97
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 404 cmt. b(1) (1987).
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Congress banned genocide in 18 U.S.C. § 1091.98 This codification
98

18 U.S.C. § 1091 (2000):
(a) Basic offense.--Whoever, whether in time of peace or
in time of war, in a circumstance described in subsection
(d) and with the specific intent to destroy, in whole or in
substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial, or religious
group as such-(1) kills members of that group;
(2) causes serious bodily injury to members of
that group;
(3) causes the permanent impairment of the
mental faculties of members of the group through
drugs, torture, or similar techniques;
(4) subjects the group to conditions of life that are
intended to cause the physical destruction of the
group in whole or in part;
(5) imposes measures intended to prevent births
within the group; or
(6) transfers by force children of the group to
another group;
or attempts to do so, shall be punished as
provided in subsection (b).
(b) Punishment for basic offense.--The punishment for an
offense under subsection (a) is-(1) in the case of an offense under subsection
(a)(1) where death results, by death or
imprisonment for life and a fine of not more than
$1,000,000, or both; and
(2) a fine of not more than $1,000,000 or
imprisonment for not more than twenty years, or
both, in any other case.
(c) Incitement offense.--Whoever in a circumstance
described in subsection (d) directly and publicly incites
another to violate subsection (a) shall be fined not more
than $500,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or
both.
(d) Required circumstance for offenses.--The circumstance
referred to in subsections (a) and (c) is that-(1) the offense is committed within the United
States; or
(2) the alleged offender is a national of the United
States (as defined in section 101 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.
1101)).
(e)
Non-applicability
of
certain
limitations.-Notwithstanding section 3282 of this title, in the case of an
offense under subsection (a)(1), an indictment may be
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simply recognized the accepted practice of using universal jurisdiction to
punish genocide.99 Israel first used universal jurisdiction in the Eichmann case
to prosecute Eichmann for executing Hitler’s “final solution” during World
War II.100 In its opinion convicting him, the Nuremburg Tribunal stated that
some offenses against the whole of humanity are so grave that “the judicial and
legislative organs of every country [need] to give effect to its criminal
interdictions and to bring the criminals to trial.”101
The United States accepted this principle in approving Israel’s request
for the extradition of Demjanjuk.102 The federal district court decided that
Israel had jurisdiction to try Demjanjuk since “[i]nternational law provides that
certain offenses may be punished by any state because the offenders are
‘common enemies of all mankind and all nations have an equal interest in their
apprehension and punishment.”103 As a party to the United Nations, which
affirmed the Nuremberg Tribunal for punishing “persecutions on political,
racial, or religious grounds” regardless of whether offenders acted “as
individuals or as members of organizations,” the United States implicitly
recognizes genocide as a crime against all of mankind.104
Congress did not explicitly pass a statute forbidding crimes against
humanity, but some statutes and court opinions indicate Congressional
consent. Acquiescence may be inferred from the Alien Tort Claims Act105 and
the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991.106 The Alien Tort Claims Act
provides that “district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.”107 As such, a victim of crimes against humanity
could sue on claims of assault or battery arising from the incident. Federal
courts held that this statute confers subject-matter jurisdiction when an alien

found, or information instituted, at any time without
limitation.
99

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 404 cmt. b(1) (1987).
100
Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 Int’l L. Rep. 50 (Sup Ct. Israel 1962).
Eichmann administered a policy that killed approximately 4,600,000 Jews. HARRIS, supra note
77, at 280 (quoting REITLINGER, THE FINAL SOLUTION (1953)).
101
Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (D.C. Jm. 1961). For more
information on the Eichmann trial and the use of the universality principle, see Kenneth C.
Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 810 (1988).
102
In re Extradition of Demjanjuk, 603 F. Supp. 1468 (N.D. Ohio 1985), affirmed 776
F.2d 571 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1016 (1986).
103
Id.
104
See G.A. Res. 95(I), 1 U.N.GAOR, U.N.Doc. A/64/Add.1, at 188 (1946); see also
Demjanjuk, 612 F. Supp. at 555 n.11 (quoting Article 6).
105
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000); see also Tachiona v. Mugabe, 234 F. Supp. 2d 401
(S.D.N.Y. 2002); Mark E. Wojcik et al., International Human Rights, 37 INT’L LAW. 597, 602
(2003).
106
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, § 1 et seq., 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
107
Id.
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sues for a tort committed in violation United States treaties or international
law.108
The Torture Victim Protection Act reinforces the widely held view that
customary international law forbids torture.109 As a party to the United Nations
Convention against Torture, which requires parties to facilitate the punishment
of torture through their municipal law,110 the United States has an obligation to
bring violators of the Convention to justice.111 Because the Convention adds to
customary international law’s prohibition on torture and requires parties to
fulfill their obligations regardless of the perpetrator’s nationality, the
Convention essentially provides for universal jurisdiction.112 Thus, the United
States could legitimately exercise jurisdiction to prosecute genocide and crimes
against humanity in federal court.
Impediments to American prosecution arise in light of conflicting
views on immunity for heads of state such as Saddam Hussein.113 Under the
concept of state immunity, the offender may be substantively liable, but
procedurally immune before the courts of other countries. Tensions between
the Pinochet case,114 authored by the House of Lords in London, and the more
recent Yerodia case,115 adjudicated by the International Court of Justice,
illustrate two divergent approaches to state immunity.
108

Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980); see also Amerada Hess
Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 425 (2d Cir. 1987), rev’d on other
grounds, 488 U.S. 428 (1989).
109
Kadic v. Karadizic, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Filartiga v. PenaIrala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980).
110
Article 4 of the Convention states:
1. Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of
torture are offenses under its criminal law. The same shall
apply to an attempt to commit torture and to an act by any
person which constitutes complicity or participation in
torture.
2. Each State Party shall make these offences
punishable by appropriate penalties which take into
account their grave nature.
Torture Convention, supra note 89.
The United States recently opposed an Optional Protocol to the Convention.
The Protocol established procedures for inspecting suspected torture detention facilities. Some
credit this hesitation to the United States own treatment of prisoners from Operation Iraqi
Freedom/the War on Terrorism. Wojcik, supra note 105, at 598.
111
See Torture Convention, supra note 89.
112
G.A. Res. 46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 51, at 197 (providing for universal
jurisdiction in its Introductory Note to Part VII).
113
See Monica Hans, Providing for Uniformity in the Exercise of Universal
Jurisdiction: Can Either the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction or an
International Criminal Court Accomplish This Goal?, 15 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 357, 379 (2002).
114
Regina v. Bow Street Magistrate, 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999)..
115
Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the
Congo v. Belgium), 2002 ICJ General List No. 121 (Feb. 14, 2002), available at
http://212.153.43.18/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobe_ijudgment_20020214.PDF
(last visited Apr. 21, 2004).
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In deciding to extradite Senator Pinochet to Spain for crimes committed
while acting as the head of state in Chile, the House of Lords examined
Pinochet’s alleged immunity based on both on the grave nature of the
underlying crime, and on an implied waiver of immunity within the United
Nations Convention against Torture.116 Six Law Lords reached the general
conclusion that Pinochet’s immunity dissipated because of torture’s status as a
“serious international crime,” established by either jus cogens or international
treaty.117 Under this approach, United States courts could adjudicate Hussein’s
acts of genocide and crimes against humanity since those crimes would also
amount to “serious international crimes.”
Lord Saville employed a theory of implied waiver of immunity based
on an assumption that the United Nations Convention against Torture
abrogated Pinochet’s immunity per se.118 Although Iraq has not signed the
Convention’s treaty, it did sign the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR),119 which outlaws a number of crimes against
116

Regina v. Bow Street Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.3), [2000] 1 A.C.
147 (House of Lords 1999).
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, entered into force 1976, 999
U.N.T.S. 171. Article 6 states:
1. Every human being has the inherent right to
life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his life.
2. In countries which have not abolished the death
penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the
most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at
the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary
to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out
pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent
court.
3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime
of genocide, it is understood that noting in this article shall
authorize any State Party to the present Covenant to
derogate in any way from any obligation assumed under
the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
4. Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right
to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence. Amnesty,
pardon or commutation of the sentence of death may be
granted in all cases.
5. Sentence of death shall not be imposed for
crimes committed by persons below 18 years of age and
shall not be carried out on pregnant women.
6. Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay
or prevent the abolition of capital punishment by any State
Party to the present Covenant.
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humanity. In addition, Lord Phillips, in his opinion, decided that because
national jurisdiction over universal crimes was such a new creation, traditional
immunities did not apply.120 Accordingly, the United States could attempt to
prosecute Hussein under both of these rationales.
The legal bar to national jurisdiction arises in the Yerodia case, which
examined the legality of an arrest warrant for Abdulaye Yerodia, the Minister
of Foreign Affairs in the Congo.121 The majority in the Yerodia case cast doubt
on two major principles from the Pinochet case: (1) whether a customary
international law norm actually emerged to abrogate immunity for “serious
international crimes”; and (2) whether national courts could prosecute officials
under circumstances similar to those in Pinochet.122 In its opinion, the majority
refused to waive immunity for incumbent officers, and stated that it could not
“deduce . . . that there exists under customary international law any form of
exception to the rule according immunity from criminal jurisdiction and
inviolability to incumbent Ministers for Foreign Affairs, where they are
suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes against humanity.”123
When the International Court of Justice subsequently listed four
circumstances where courts could prosecute high officials internationally, it
excluded the circumstances of the Pinochet prosecution.124 Acceptable
conditions for abrogating immunity for officials included the following
circumstances: (1) when an official is charged in his or her own country and
tried under the laws of that country, (2) when the official’s own state waives
sovereign immunity, (3) when the official commits the acts “prior or
subsequent to his or her period of office,” or “during that period of office in a
private capacity,” or, finally, (4) when the official is prosecuted before an
international court such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, “ICTY,” and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,
“ICTR,” or the International Criminal Court, “ICC.”125 Since Saddam Hussein
committed genocide and crimes against humanity while acting as head of state
and Iraq has not waived immunity, the only court with jurisdiction under this
Id.
120

Regina v. Bow Street Magistrate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.3), [2000] 1 A.C.
284-90 (House of Lords 1999); see also Sarah C. Rispin, Development, Implications of
Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium on the Pinochet Precedent: A Setback for
International Human Rights Litigation? 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 527, 531 (2002).
121
See Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic
of the Congo v. Belgium), 2002 ICJ General List No. 121 , at para. 58 (Feb. 14, 2002),
available
at
http://212.153.43.18/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobe_ijudgment_20020214.PDF;
Mark A. Summers, The International Court of Justice’s Decision in Congo v. Belgium: How
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All States to Prosecute War Criminals?, 21 B.U. INT’L L.J. 63 (2003).
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Rispin, supra note 120, at 529.
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Regina v. Bow Street Magistrate, 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999).
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analysis would be the ICC or an ad hoc tribunal set up by the Security Council
that would resemble the ICTR and the ICTY.
Although the Congress enacted legislation enabling United States
federal courts to prosecute genocide and crimes against humanity based on
universal jurisdiction, Hussein’s immunity as head of state bars national
prosecution. American courts could focus on the Pinochet case rather than the
Yerodia case; however, given the public nature of such a trial, this selective
focus might compromise the legitimacy of a conviction. At the
recommendation of the International Court of Justice, only an ad hoc tribunal
set up by the United Nations Security Council, or the ICC could legitimately
abrogate Hussein’s official head of state immunity for acts committed while in
office.
C. The International Criminal Court
In light of the Yerodia case, the ICC appears ideal for prosecution of
Saddam Hussein.126 However, jurisdictional limitations will foreclose this
option unless the Security Council (1) fulfills its obligation to enforce its own
resolutions through the ICC and (2) applies the enabling statute retroactively
(as was done in the Nuremberg Tribunal). History and difficult negotiations
surrounding the text of the Rome Statute, the ICC’s enabling statute, indicate
that an ex post facto application of the ICC is unlikely to occur.
On July 17, 1998, 120 countries adopted the text of the Rome Statute,
which entered into force on July 1, 2002.127 Article 11 of the statute limits the
court’s jurisdiction to crimes committed after it entered into force and applies
only to states who acquiesce, or “sign-on,” to the statute.128 Although Hussein
committed human rights violations throughout his dictatorship, many of his
overt acts occurred during the 1980s, before the statute even existed.
Additionally, but not surprisingly, Iraq has not signed the Rome Statute.129
Article 13, however, allows the United Nation’s Security Council, under its
Chapter VII power, to refer crimes to the ICC.130
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United Nations: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998,
37 I.L.M. 999, 1003 (1998) [hereinafter International Criminal Court].
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See Damir Arnaut, When in Rome . . .? The International Criminal Court and
Avenues for U.S. Participation, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 525, 526 (2003).
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The ICC may exercise its jurisdiction if an alleged crime occurred in a signatory
state’s territory or if the crime was committed by a national of a signatory state. Arnaut, supra
note 127, at 538. Thus, if the United States signed the Rome Statute and could establish a link
between Saddam Hussein and the bombings of the World Trade Center on September 11,
2000, then the ICC may have jurisdiction over the dispute. Otherwise, it initially seems that
either a national citizen of that state party must commit the crime, or the crime must occur in a
state party’s territory. Id.
129
The United States has not signed the Rome Statute either.
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Article 12(2), 13(b); Arnaut, supra note 127, at 538.
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In reality, the Security Council’s powers remain the same. The Council
implemented tribunals in both Rwanda and Yugoslavia.131 Theoretically, Iraq
is no different. The difference lies in the forum as the ICC, rather than as an ad
hoc tribunal. In 1991, the Security Council issued Resolution 688 that stated
that it was “[g]ravely concerned by the repression of the Iraqi civilian
population” and “[d]eeply disturbed by the magnitude of human suffering.”132
Consequently, it insisted that Iraq “allow immediate access by international
humanitarian organizations,” and requested the Secretary-General “pursue his
humanitarian efforts in Iraq” and “use all the resources at his disposal,
including those of the relevant United Nations agencies, to address urgently
the critical needs of the refugees and displaced Iraqi population.”133 Although
the Council laid the groundwork for intervention, for the ICC to exercise
jurisdiction, the Council would need to not only refer Saddam Hussein to the
ICC for trial, but also undermine the key principle of non-retroactivity.
Because many states accepted the Rome Statute because of its nonretroactive stance, a retroactive application may cause these states to rethink
their acquiescence to the ICC. Sensitive diplomatic issues may also arise since
the United States refused to become a party to the ICC.134 The ICC imposes no
obligations on non-party states. As it currently stands, Iraq need not comply
with ICC orders, extradite individuals, or supply evidence.135 Tensions
between the United States and the United Nations over war with Iraq could
lead to a jurisdictional fight to prosecute. This would be particularly
unfortunate in light of the necessity for unified international action.
Even though the ICC does not provide a viable forum for prosecution,
its principles and law will likely influence those applied to Hussein’s trial
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regardless of where it takes place.136 The ICC’s Statute of Rome is the most
recent and widely accepted codification of international criminal law. These
statutes assume individual responsibility for crimes against the entire
international community.137 In creating the Statute, its multi-national drafters
relied on principles established in the ITCY, ITCR, Genocide Convention,
Nuremberg Charter, and customary international law. As a result, any
prosecution of Hussein should refer to this codification to conduct a trial that
the majority of countries would view as fair and just.
D. Ad Hoc Tribunal
The ad hoc tribunal provides the fourth and best option for Hussein’s
prosecution. Under its Chapter VII powers, the United Nations Security
Council may establish an ad hoc international criminal tribunal after it
determines a threat to international peace and security.138 The Security Council
instituted ad hoc tribunals for Yugoslavia (ICTY)139 and for Rwanda
(ICTR).140 The Council fashioned these tribunals after the International
Military Tribunal, which was created by a treaty rather than by the United
Nations. These tribunals survived challenges to the Security Council’s power
to create them under Articles 39 and 40 of the United Nations Charter.141 The
tribunals may exert subject-matter jurisdiction over both crimes against
humanity, genocide, and war crimes. To ensure consistency, the same appellate
body hears appeals from both the ICTY and the ICTR.
Tribunals simply apply existing law. The ICTY Statute requires that it
apply only that “part of conventional international humanitarian law which has
beyond all doubt become part of customary international law . . . .”142 If the
136
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February 16, 2004).
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Security Council creates a tribunal for Iraq, the law would not apply ex post
facto since it already existed as customary law and would resemble the ICTY
and ICTR statutes. A tribunal would also avoid the problem of retroactivity in
the ICC. Accordingly, to avoid challenges to the legitimacy of the prosecution,
the Council should establish an International Criminal Tribunal for Iraq (ICTI)
that parallels those of the ICTY and the ICTR. The same appellate body
hearing appeals from the ICTY and ICTR could handle appeals for the ICTI.
Although the United States has demonstrated hostility toward ad hoc tribunals
in the past,143 diplomatic and legal impediments to prosecution of Hussein in
other courts may encourage United States’ agreement. The ICTI would allow
the victims of the regime to attend and testify in Hussein’s trial since it would
occur in Iraq as well as provide the legal expertise for a trial of this magnitude.
In fact, the Iraqi National Congress proposed and drafted a statute for this type
of United Nations ad hoc tribunal to try Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi
Ba’athist leadership.144 Since many of Iraq’s new leaders may come from this
National Congress, the new leadership may also request an ad hoc tribunal.
Even though both the ICTY and the ICTR survived challenges to the
Security Council’s power to create them, Hussein could still attempt a
jurisdictional argument to prevent prosecution. Because the judges employed
by the tribunals also rule on the validity of the tribunal’s establishment,
Hussein could claim that the proceeding was not fair and impartial. Allowing
judges to make appellate decisions concerning their own employment may be a
conflict of interest.145 Hussein’s difficulty in asserting this defense would be
the lack of any other court to hear his challenge. Alternatively, conducting the
ad hoc tribunal in Iraq would provide for the close proximity of witnesses,146
promote reconciliation by allowing victims to attend the trials, and would
nature of international law and the lack of agreement on points of customary law may make it
difficult for the ICTY to apply this rough statutory guide that incorporates customary
international law.
143
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ensure a more impartial trial than would a trial by either the Iraqi citizens or
the new regime. Therefore, the ad hoc tribunal presents the best forum for
jurisdiction.
III. IRAQ’S INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
Should the ICTI survive Hussein’s jurisdictional challenge, it could
enforce Iraq’s treaty commitments as well as its commitments under current
customary international law. Hussein’s commission of genocide and crimes
against humanity violated numerous human rights treaties signed by Iraq. As
of December 9, 2002, Iraq accepted the terms of the following treaties: the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR),
which Iraq signed on January 25, 1971;147 the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Iraq also signed on January 25, 1971;148
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (CERD), signed on January 14, 1970;149 the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),
signed on August 13, 1986;150 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
signed on June 15, 1994.151 As a member of the United Nations, Iraq has an
additional “obligation to promote and protect human rights and fundamental
freedoms” and to abide by the “obligations [it has] undertaken” by signing
human rights treaties.152 Like other states, Iraq must comply with customary
law regardless of treaty ratification status.153
147
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148
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21
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The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law helps clarify obligations
under customary international law. Iraq would violate customary international
law if, as a matter of state policy, it practiced, encouraged or condoned:
(a) genocide,
(b) slavery or slave trade,
(c) the murder or causing the disappearance of
individuals,
(d) torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishment,
(e) prolonged arbitrary detention,
(f) systematic racial discrimination, or
(g) a consistent pattern of gross violations of
internationally recognized human rights.154
Sections (a)-(f) are considered jus cogens, or peremptory norms to which all
countries must adhere.155 According to the Vienna Convention on Treaty
interpretation, an international agreement or reservation that attempted to
derogate from those norms would be void.156

interrelation between treaties and customary international law, see Evan Criddle, The Vienna
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IV. GENOCIDE AGAINST THE KURDS
A. Evolution of Genocide from Customary International Law
As a peremptory norm of international law, any act of genocide would
be illegal regardless of Iraq’s international obligations. Raphael Lemkin, a
Polish law professor, first coined the term “genocide” in 1944, and intended it
to signify “a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of
essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating
the groups themselves.”157 After World War II, the Allies formed the London
Agreement, which included the Nuremberg Charter.158 The Allies used this
agreement to prosecute the Nazis for crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
crimes against peace. Since the Nuremberg indictments did not specifically
include genocide, prosecutors charged defendants with “deliberate and
systematic genocide” under the larger heading of crimes against humanity.159
The tribunal did not convict any defendants directly or solely on this charge.160
The Nuremberg Tribunals applied charges of crimes against humanity
retroactively since the drafters considered those crimes part of customary
international law.161
Allied Control Council Law No. 10 (Control Council Law) built on
Nuremberg’s first mention of genocide.162 Becoming effective in 1945, it
provided a broader definition of crimes against humanity that allowed for
prosecutions of genocide under its opening phrase, “including, but not limited
to.” Two American courts, prosecuting crimes against humanity under their
authority as an Allied occupation zone, applied this Control Council Law and
convicted several defendants of genocide.163 These trials of Josef Alstötter,
157
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Ulrich Greifelt, and others led to convictions based on participation “in the
crime of genocide” and involvement in a systematic program of genocide164
aimed at “the destruction of foreign nations and ethnic groups.”165 These
American trials, along with genocide trials in Poland,166 propelled and
prompted the international community to adopt a multilateral treaty on
genocide that entered into effect in 1951.167
This multilateral treaty, the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Convention), to which Iraq
acceded on January 20, 1959, defined genocide in Article II as:
Any of the following acts committed with intent
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic,
racial or religious group, as such:
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group;168
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group.169
To convict Hussein of genocide he must have “committed” one or more of the
above forbidden acts against members of a protected group with the intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, that group.170 Hussein did not have to perform the
acts himself. Instead, under Article III of the Genocide Convention, acts
punishable under the treaty include “genocide; conspiracy to commit genocide;
direct and public incitement to commit genocide; attempt to commit genocide;
Crims., 1 (1949), available at http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/WCC/greifelt1.htm (last visited Apr.
21, 2004).
164
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165
Greifelt, 8 L. Rep. Trials War Crims. at 3.
166
See Trial of Gauleiter Artur Greiser, in 13 L. Rep. Trials War Crim. 70, 80-84
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[and] complicity in genocide.”171 Thus, if Hussein specifically ordered or even
turned a blind eye to any of these acts, his failure to act would constitute
genocide under the Genocide Convention. The International Court of Justice,
the ITCY and ITCR statutes, as well as the International Criminal Court statute
all follow the Convention’s definition and its general elements.
Even if Iraq had not acceded to the Convention, as a party to the United
Nations, it must uphold certain basic human rights found in the preamble to the
United Nations Charter. The preamble states that members of the United
Nations aim to “reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and
worth of the human person.”172 Genocide derogates from this general principle
by disregarding the value of human life.
B. Genocide against The Kurds: The Anfal Campaigns
Rather than reaffirming human rights, a number of documents and
testimonials show that Hussein, through his own acts and the acts of others,
attempted to annihilate the Kurdish segment of the Iraqi population. Because
Hussein served as the RCC’s member in charge of “Kurdish affairs,” President
of the Republic of Iraq, and Secretary General of the Ba’th Party, he is liable
under the principle of command responsibility for ordering official acts. He
specifically ordered, directed, and appointed his cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid,
“Chemical Ali,” to implement a comprehensive campaign against the Kurds
which resulted in: (1) concentration camps, (2) mass summary executions, (3)
widespread use of chemical weapons against the city of Halabja and dozens of
Kurdish villages, and (4) complete destruction of Kurdish villages, which
government documents described as “burned, destroyed, demolished, and
purified.”173 In the words of Al-Majid, the Iraqi government took these steps
“to solve the Kurdish problem and slaughter the saboteurs.”174 “Saboteurs”
171
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HARRIS, supra note 77, at 1048 (providing the text of the United Nations Charter).
173
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/MIDDLE EAST, supra note Error! Bookmark not
defined., at 1-2; see also IRAQI NATIONAL CONGRESS, supra note 32, at 70-71.
174
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/MIDDLE EAST, supra note Error! Bookmark not
defined., at 1. Ali Hassan Al-Majid ,or “Chemical Ali” recorded a number of meetings with
senior Ba’ath officials in 1988 and 1989. In March 1991, a number of these tapes were found
in Iraqi government offices and from al-Majid’s home in Kurkuk and given to Human Rights
Watch. In one of these tapes, dated May 26, 1988, Chemical Ali stated:
172

We continued the deportations. I told the
mustashars that they might say that they like their villages
and that they won't leave. I said I cannot let your village
stay because I will attack it with chemical weapons. Then
you and your family will die. You must leave right now.
Because I cannot tell you the same day that I am going to
attack with chemical weapons. I will kill them all with
chemical weapons! Who is going to say anything? The
international community? Fuck them! The international
community and those who listen to them.
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refers to the Kurdish guerrillas and civilian sympathizers. When first ordered
by Hussein to quiet the “Kurdish rebellion,” Al-Majid said “What am I
supposed to do with them, these goats? . . . Take good care of them? No, I will
bury them with bulldozers.”175 This symbolized the beginning of the Anfal
Campaigns.176 Although initially believed dead, coalition forces captured AlMajid, or “Chemical Ali,” on August 21, 2003.177 Consequently, he may also
face prosecution in an ad hoc tribunal.
Although President Hussein vested many of the powers for handling
“Kurdish affairs” to his cousin, he involved himself personally in the
operational aspects of Anfal through his position as president of the
republic.178 After “redrawing the map of Iraqi Kurdistan,” which demonstrated
his premeditation to commit genocide, approximately 5,000 to 8,000
Barzani179 males “disappeared.”180 As President, Saddam Hussein stated,
“[t]hey betrayed the country and they betrayed the covenant . . . we meted out
stern punishment to them and they went to hell.”181 Although these acts
… This is my intention, and I want you to take serious note
of it. As soon as we complete the deportations, we will
start attacking them everywhere according to a systematic
military plan. Even their strongholds. In our attacks we
will take back one third or one half of what is under their
control. If we can try to take two-thirds, then we will
surround them in a small pocket and attack them with
chemical weapons. I will not attack them with chemicals
just one day, but I will continue to attack them with
chemicals for fifteen days. Then I will announce that
anyone who wishes to surrender with his gun will be
allowed to do so. Anyone willing to come back is
welcome, and those who do not return will be attacked
again with new, destructive chemicals. I will not mention
the name of the chemical because that is classified
information. But I will say with new destructive weapons
that will destroy you. So I will threaten them and motivate
them to surrender.
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175
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occurred over the past twenty years, genocide is not subject to a statute of
limitations.182 Any act of genocide violates Iraq’s obligations under the ICCPR
to respect and promote the right to life.183
To convict Hussein of genocide, the prosecutor must prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that Hussein killed the Kurds, caused them serious bodily or
mental harm, deliberately inflicted conditions of life calculated to bring about
the their physical destruction, imposed measures intended to prevent Kurdish
births, or forcibly transferred Kurdish children to another group.184 The Kurds
must also qualify as a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, and the
prosecutor must prove that Hussein intended to destroy them in whole or in
part.185
1. Concentration Camps
Hussein’s design of the Kurdish concentration camps inflicted
conditions so severe that they would meet the Genocide Convention’s
requirement that the perpetrator establish an environment “calculated to bring
about [the group’s] physical destruction in whole or in part.”186 In Prosecutor
v. Akayesu, ICTR interpreted Article II(c) of the Genocide Convention as
requiring the subjection of “a group of people to a subsistence diet, systematic
expulsion from homes and the reduction of essential medical services.”187
Conditions in Kurdish camps met these requirements, as well as the
Convention’s requirements for “causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group,” under Article II (b). In the Eichmann case, the District
Court of Jerusalem stated that bodily or mental harm can be caused by
“enslavement, starvation, deportation and persecution . . . and by their
detention in ghettos, transit camps and concentration camps in conditions
which were designed to cause their degradation, deprivation of their rights as
human beings, and to suppress them and cause them inhumane suffering and
torture.”188
It will be difficult to prosecute Hussein for this phase of the genocide
without conclusive documentation of his knowledge of the camps.189 The
182
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tribunal may infer Hussein’s intent, on a case-by-case basis from the material
evidence so long as this evidence establishes a consistent pattern of conduct.190
Although the ad hoc tribunal may impute the requisite knowledge from
Hussein’s numerous official positions, he could argue that he lacked all
knowledge because he designated both power and authority over the camps to
Chemical Ali.
2. Summary Executions
The Ba’ath Party itself established the principle of “collective
implication” in the executions.191 The Party insisted that its members form part
of the firing squads.192 For example, when Saddam Hussein assumed his
presidency, he forced two dozen senior Ba’ath officials to confess to charges of
treason.193 He then ordered the other senior officials to execute them on
television to demonstrate their new loyalty to Hussein.194 On June 20, 1987,
another document issued by the Northern Bureau Command with the seal of
the RCC (which Hussein chairs) endorsed a policy of mass murder and
incitement to pillage. It directed:
Genocide is distinct from other crimes insomuch
as it embodies a special intent or dolus specialis. Special
intent of a crime is the specific intention, required as a
constructive element of the crime, which demands that the
perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act charged. Thus
the special intent in the crime of genocide lies in “the
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical,
racial or religious group.” The Chamber found that “the
offender is culpable only when he has committed one of
the offences charged under Article 2(2) . . . with the clear
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group.
The offender is culpable because he knew or should have
known that the act committed would destroy, in whole or
in part, a group.”
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4. The corps commanders shall carry out random
bombardments using artillery, helicopters and
aircraft, at all times of the day or night in order
to kill the largest number of persons present in
those prohibited zones, keeping us informed of
the
results.
5. All persons captured in those villages shall be
detained and interrogated by the security services
and those between the ages of 15 and 70 shall be
executed after any useful information has been
obtained from them, of which we should be duly
notified.195
Al-Majid signed the document and forwarded it to numerous branches
including the Chairmen of the Legislative and Executive Councils and Party
Intelligence.196 Under the Genocide Convention, summary and targeted
executions constitute intentionally “killing members of the group” because
they meet the ICTR requirement of “homicide with the intent to cause
death.”197 The prosecution could prove the requisite mens rea and
premeditation by using documents exchanged between Al-Majid and Hussein,
as well as government videotapes of massive executions.198
195
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3. Widespread Use of Chemical Weapons
The Iraqi regime kept meticulous records and routinely videotaped
chemical weapons attacks on civilians as well as executions and village
clearances.199 Having cameras ready to videotape the attacks demonstrates
premeditation.200 Saddam Hussein murdered about 100,000 Kurds with
chemical weapons.201 Under Article II (b) of the Genocide Convention, acts of
chemical destruction resulting in death constitute genocide in that they meet
the definitions of “killing members of the group” and “causing serious bodily
and mental harm to members of the group.”202
As the ICTR noted in Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana, the
tribunal should interpret the meaning of “serious bodily harm” and “serious
mental harm” on a “case-by-case basis, using a common sense approach.”203
According to the ICTR, “causing serious bodily harm” “could be construed to
mean harm that seriously injures the health, causes disfigurement or causes any
serious injury to the external, internal organs or senses.”204 Acts of “serious
mental harm” likewise includes “acts of bodily or mental torture, inhumane or
degrading treatment, rape, sexual violence, and persecution.”205 The chemicals
may have caused a lasting effect on the Kurds; however, the effects need not
prove indelible or permanent for successful prosecution.206
4. Complete Destruction of Kurdish Villages
Destruction of Kurdish homes, crops, and livestock by the Iraqi
government exhibited Hussein’s desire to inflict conditions that would bring
about the Kurds’ physical destruction. The United Nations Special Rapporteur
be demonstrated by a pattern of purposeful action.” The tribunal included the following factors
as relevant indicators of a pattern of purposeful action:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

“the number of group members affected;”
“the physical targeting of the group or their property;”
“the use of derogatory language toward members of the targeted group;”
“the weapons employed and the extent of bodily injury;”
“the methodical way of planning;”
“the systematic manner of killing;” and
“the relative proportionate scale of the actual or attempted destruction of a group.”
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made numerous inquiries to Hussein asking for explanations of orders
directing the execution of wounded civilians and the razing of certain
neighborhoods.207 He sent no response. A government document titled
“Registry of Eliminated Villages” contained the names and locations of a large
number of eliminated villages.208 The ICTR Chamber reasoned that
systematically expelling people from their homes would satisfy the requisite
actus reus of Article II(c) of the Genocide Convention.209
C. The Kurds as an Ethnic Group and Hussein’s Intent to Destroy
For Hussein’s actions to qualify as genocide against the Kurds, the
Kurds must qualify as a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.210 In
addition, Saddam Hussein must have intended to destroy them in whole or in
part.211 The Kurds form a distinct ethnic group; they developed their own
culture with a unique Kurdish style of dress and they speak their own
language.212 They lived in the northern mountainous region of Iraq for
thousands of years—the region was even designated “Kurdistan” in the 12th
century.213 The ICTR, in Prosecutor v. Akayesu,214 stated that the term “ethnic
group” is “used to refer to a group whose members speak the same language
and/or have the same culture.”215 The Kurds have both their own language and
their own distinct culture, thus they qualify as an ethnic group for the purposes
of the Genocide Convention.
When Saddam Hussein appointed his cousin, Ali Hassan al-Majid, to
extinguish the Kurds, Hussein exhibited the requisite intent to annihilate this
ethnic group. One observer stated of Al-Majid, “‘[h]e was stupid and only
carrying out Saddam Hussein’s orders.’”216 Documented exchanges between
Al-Majid and Saddam Hussein make it clear that Hussein knew and approved
of Al-Majid’s work.217 Besides a jurisdictional challenge, claiming that
Hussein did not act with the requisite intent may be his best defense to
genocide. Accordingly, he could allege that he simply moved or deported the
Kurds without intending to destroy them. Hussein’s act of designating the
power to Al-Majid works in Hussein’s favor. He may claim that because he
207
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delegated all the power and authority for dealing with the Kurds to Al-Majid,
Al-Majid acted without Hussein’s approval or knowledge. Although the court
could still infer knowledge through command responsibility, the prosecution
may find it more difficult to establish intent through this theory.
Because Iraq acceded to the Genocide Convention on January 20, 1959,
the crime of genocide existed in the form of a treaty and as customary
international law during the 1980s when the majority of the above acts
occurred. Accordingly, no significant legal barriers, such as an ex post facto
application of the law, exist for prosecuting Saddam Hussein for genocide.
Plentiful evidence exists to convict him for conspiracy to commit genocide,218
direct and public incitement to commit genocide,219 or complicity in
genocide.220
Despite the mounting evidence against him, Hussein’s defense
attorneys may rely on a number of mitigating factors. Hussein did attempt to
unite the Kurds and the Iraqi people to create a state with a unique national
identity. To create this state, Hussein spent significant financial resources to
recover artifacts and piece together Iraq’s cultural history.221 He was the first
Iraqi leader to visit the Kurdish region.222 In fact, not until the United States,
Iran, and Israel contributed resources to promote the Kurdish insurgency in the
1970s did Hussein begin the Anfal campaigns. Not only did the United States
help ignite the conflict, it removed sanctions from Iraq in 1982 and shared
218

“[C]onspiracy to commit genocide is to be defined as an agreement between two
or more persons to commit the crime of genocide.” Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-9613-A, para. 798 (ICTR Trial Chamber, Jan. 27, 2000). For a detailed analysis of the elements
for conspiracy to commit genocide, see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES,
AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: TOPICAL DIGESTS OF THE CASE LAW OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA (2004).
219
The tribunal in Prosecutor v. Akayesu stated:
[D]irect and public incitement must be defined . .
. as directly provoking the perpetrator(s) to commit
genocide, whether through speeches, shouting or threats
uttered in public places or at public gatherings, or through
the sale or dissemination, offer for sale or display of
written material or printed matter in public places or at
public gatherings, or through the public display of placards
or posters, or through any other means of audiovisual
communication.
Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgment, para. 559 (ICTR Trial Chamber I, Sept. 2, 1998).
220
In Prosecutor v. Semanza, the tribunal defined complicity in genocide. Case No.
ICTR-97-20, para. 393 (ICTR Trial Chamber, May 15, 2003). It stated, “prior jurisprudence
has defined the term complicity as adding and abetting, instigating, and procuring.” Id.
“[C]omplicity to commit genocide in Article 2(3) refers to all acts of assistance of
encouragement that have substantially contributed to, or have had a substantial effect on, the
completion of the crime of genocide.” Id. at para. 395.
221
Knowles, supra note 15, at 156.
222
CHRISTINE MOSS HELMS, IRAQ: EASTERN FLANK OF THE ARAB WORLD 12 (1984).

35

military intelligence with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war.223 This union
culminated in 1984 when, despite Iraq’s use of chemical weapons on Iranians,
the Regan administration sent Donald Rumsfeld to Iraq to strengthen ties with
Saddam Hussein and to offer additional intelligence and money. When the
United States eventually incited Kurdish rebellion but failed to support it in
1991, Saddam Hussein squelched the rebellion with a widespread massacre of
the Shi’ites. Consequently, Hussein’s attorneys may try to bring the United
States in as a co-conspirator and deflect attention away from Hussein’s acts
and toward discovering exactly what the United States knew.
V. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY COMMITTED IN IRAQ
Saddam Hussein did not end his struggle to maintain power with Anfal
campaigns or the Kurdish people. As head of the RCC, Hussein personally
signed decrees condoning torture, deportation, unfair trials, amputations, and
branding against his own people. Because many of these actions qualify as
crimes against humanity, the ICTI prosecutor may indicate and prosecute
Hussein for these acts.
A. Evolution of Crimes against Humanity
Like genocide, as the name “crimes against humanity” suggests, these
crimes offend the whole of humanity and, consequently, the ICTR and ICTY
considers them international crimes. A Baptist minister first coined the phrase
“crimes against humanity,” in an 1890 letter to the United States Secretary of
State.224 However, the 1945 Nuremberg trials first defined and prosecuted
defendants for crimes against humanity.225 The Nuremberg Charter
substantively removed state immunity for crimes against humanity, and
described these crimes as:
Murder,
extermination,
enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population, before or during
the war, or persecutions on political, racial, or
religious grounds in execution of or in
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal whether or not in violation of the
domestic law of the country where
perpetrated.226

223

See Human Rights Watch World Report 1989, Human Rights Watch, available at
http://www.hrw.org/reports/1989/WR89/Iraq.htm#TopOfPage (last visited Feb. 21, 2004).
224
James D. Fry, Comment, Terrorism as a Crime Against Humanity and Genocide:
The Backdoor to Universal Jurisdiction, 7 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 169, 183 (2002)
(citing ADAM HOCHSCHILD, KING LEOPOLD’S GHOST 112, 317 n.112 (1998)).
225
Id.
226
Nuremberg Charter, supra note 158.

36

Hussein did not have to personally commit these acts since “[l]eaders,
organizers, instigators, and accomplices, participating in the formulation or
execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing
crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of
such plan.”227 Approval by the United Nation’s General Assembly to use this
definition to prosecute heads of state chipped away at traditional immunity and
helped solidify the introduction of crimes against humanity into international
law.228
Unlike genocide, definitions for crimes against humanity vary. The
Tokyo Charter in Article 5(c) resembled the Nuremberg Charter, but did not
include persecutions on religious grounds.229 Allied Control Council Law No.
10, Article 2, broadened the concept of crimes against humanity in its
definition by including the words “not limited to” and by specifically adding
“imprisonment, torture, [and] rape.”230 Furthermore, the ICTR and ICTY
defined crimes against humanity differently from both former definitions and
from one another. A prosecutor in the ICTY may prosecute “murder,
extermination, enslavement, deportation, imprisonment, torture, rape,
persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds, and other inhumane
acts” only when committed in armed conflict and directed against a civilian
population.231 The ICTR, on the other hand, allows the prosecutor to prosecute
when the accused “committed [acts] as part of a widespread or systematic
attack against any civilian population on national, political, ethnic, racial or
religious grounds.”232 Though the ICTY does not specify the need for a
“widespread or systematic attack,” it interpreted the phrase “civilian
population” to include this requirement.233
227
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In the International Criminal Court, relevant portions of Article 7
similarly define crimes against humanity to include murder, “[d]eportation or
forcible transfer of [a] population,” “[p]ersecution against any identifiable
group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious . . .
or other grounds,” “[i]mprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical
liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law,” and torture. For
any of these acts to qualify as crimes against humanity the perpetrator must
commit them as “part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against a
civilian population” and have knowledge of the attack’s systematic nature.
Crimes against humanity may occur during peacetime or war.234 Like the
ICTR, the Rome Statute employs the qualification “widespread or systematic
attack” which broadens its jurisdiction and makes these requirements
alternatives. This mirrors the most recent approach taken by the ICTY in
Prosecutor v. Tadić.235 The ICTR, while it does not use an either/or approach,
defined the term “widespread” as “massive, frequent, large scale action, carried
out collectively with considerable seriousness and directed against a
multiplicity of victims.”236 The court interpreted “systematic” as “thoroughly
organized and following a regular pattern on the basis of a common policy
involving substantial public or private resources.”237
B. Basic Elements Pertinent To All Crimes against Humanity
Regardless of the precise language used in any one statute, the
prosecution must establish the same five elements under Article 5 of the ICTY,
Article 3 of the ICTR, and Article 7 of the ICC to prove Hussein’s guilt. These
elements include: (1) the occurrence of an “attack”; (2) a link or “nexus”
between Saddam Hussein’s action or inaction and the attack; (3) the attack’s
“widespread or systematic” nature; (4) the attack’s target as a civilian
population; and finally, (5) that Hussein’s knowledge of the attacks fulfills the
requisite mens rea.238
Hussein conducted several “attacks” by deporting the Kurds, depriving
Iraqi citizens of fundamental liberties, and by torturing Iraqi citizens.239 These
instances qualify as attacks because the term concerns the mistreatment of
civilians including the state’s own population.240 The ICTY, in Prosecutor v.
234
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Nikolic, listed several factors relevant for determining whether an attack
occurred against a civilian population.241 In its list, the court examined
“whether summary arrests, detention, torture and other crimes have been
committed,” and “whether massive transfers of civilians to camps have taken
place.”242 Similarly, the ICTR, in Prosecutor v. Akayesu, stated, “the act must
be inhumane in nature and character, causing great suffering or serious injury
to body or to mental or to physical health.”243 These factors remain particularly
relevant in the Iraqi situation where the government transferred Kurds to
camps, summarily arrested them,244 detained them,245 and tortured Iraqi
civilians.246 Each of these actions constitutes an attack; thus, the first element
is satisfied.
The second element, the nexus between the acts of Hussein and the
attacks, is detailed in each specific act’s section below. However, within each
section two things must be established: (1) the “commission” of the act
(deportation, deprivation, torture) that furthered the attack against the Iraqi
people (including the Kurds), and (2) Saddam Hussein’s knowledge that these
orders/acts constituted part of the greater “attack.”247 A single act, such as
issuing a decree, suffices so long as it is part of the larger attack.248
The Iraqi population satisfies the third requirement that Hussein carry
out the attack on “a civilian population.” As Iraqis living under Hussein’s
regime, they possess the requisite characteristic of a geographically selfcontained group of people.249 In some ways, the breadth of the Iraqi population
as a target also satisfies the fourth element of a “widespread or systematic
attack.” To qualify as a widespread or systematic attack, the action “need not
be committed at the same time and place as the attack or share all of the
features of the attack,” however, “it must, by its characteristics, aims, nature,
or consequence objectively form part of the discriminatory attack.”250
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Hussein’s actions fulfill both requirements since the Iraqi population comprises
a large number of victims and Hussein,251 in his power as president,
orchestrated a systematic governmental attack against them.252
Finally, the prosecutor must establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
Saddam Hussein possessed mens rea that demonstrated he knew about the
attack.253 As interpreted by the ICTR, Hussein must have “actual or
constructive knowledge of the broader context of the attack, meaning that
[Hussein] must known that his act(s) is part of a widespread or systematic
attack on a civilian population and pursuant to some kind of policy or plan.”254
To establish intent for certain acts, the ICC requires the perpetrator to either
“mean to cause that consequence,” or be “aware that it will occur in the
ordinary course of events.”255 “Knowledge” is similar, but for purposes of the
Rome Statute, it means “awareness that a circumstance exists or a consequence
will occur in the ordinary course of events.”256 Mental elements requiring that
Hussein knew about the widespread or systematic attack, do not require proof
that he knew everything about the attack, or even that he knew the precise
details of plans.257 The prosecutor may satisfy these elements by a simple
indication that the Hussein intended to “further such an attack.”258
The prosecutor may have the most difficulty proving the mens rea
element. For the most part, crimes against humanity are not strict liability
crimes. Article 28 of the ICC provides guidance by discussing a form of
constructive knowledge for trying “superiors” such as Saddam Hussein.
Hussein could be held criminally responsible for crimes against humanity
committed by his subordinates. These subordinates would include the Iraqi
of victims.” Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, para. 580 (ICTR Trial Chamber,
Sept. 2, 1998). “The concept of ‘systematic’ may be defined as thoroughly organised and
following a regular pattern on the basis of a common policy involving substantial public or
private resources. There is no requirement that this policy must be adopted formally as the
policy of a state. There must however be some kind of preconceived plan or policy.” Id.
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military or any type of Iraqi security force. Hence, Hussein may be liable for
failing to “exercise control properly over such subordinates” in three
situations: (1) where Hussein either knew, or “consciously disregarded”
information, such as United Nations or Human Rights reports indicating that
his subordinates were either committing or about to commit such crimes; (2)
where the crimes “concerned activities that were within [his] effective
responsibility and control”; or (3) where Hussein failed to take all “necessary
and reasonable measures” within his power to stop the acts from being
committed, or alternatively, failed to “submit the matter to the competent
authorities for investigation and prosecution.”259 The ICC’s position, requiring
that a superior knew or should have known, differs from an earlier position
taken by the United States Supreme Court which applied a standard just short
of strict liability to a Japanese Commanding General.260
C. Saddam Hussein’s Crimes against Humanity
1. Deportation or Forcible Transfer of the Kurdish Population
The prosecutor may address the majority of Saddam Hussein’s actions
against the Kurds under the Genocide Convention. However, the Convention
does not address deportation, which constitutes a distinct crime against
humanity. The United Nations General Assembly expressed concern over the
“forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians,” “the
destruction of Iraqi towns and villages,” and “the fact that tens of thousands of
displaced Kurds have had to take refuge in camps and shelters in the north of
Iraq.”261
Customary international law recognizes deportation as a crime against
humanity, as does Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter, Article 5(d) of the
ICTY, Article 3(d) of the ICTR, and in Allied Control Council Law No. 10. In
addition, the ICCPR states, “no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to
enter his own country.”262 To convict Hussein of deporting the Kurdish
population, he must have used expulsion or other types of coercion to forcibly
transfer or deport one or more persons into another State or place.263
“Population,” as interpreted by the ICTY in the Tadic case, “impl[ies] crimes
of a collective nature and thus exclude single or isolated acts which . . . do not
rise to the level of crimes against humanity.”264 The Iraqi regime’s
displacement of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi civilians qualifies as more than
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a single or isolated act. “Forcibly” does not denote only physical force, but
may also encompass threats or types of coercion caused by creating a coercive
environment or by using “fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological
oppression or abuse of power.”265 Hussein appears to have forcibly deported
the Kurds. He issued an order concerning Kurdish villages that stated, “within
their jurisdiction, the armed forces must kill any human being or animal
present within these areas. They are totally prohibited.”266
In addition to a forcible deportation, the displaced persons must have
been “lawfully present” in the area prior to being moved.267 “Lawful” probably
refers first to national law, but where a national law severely contradicts an
international law, as in the Iraqi situation, then “lawful” should refer to an
international principle.268 Otherwise, dictators such as Hussein could
circumvent this element by enforcing self-interested laws like Iraqi directive
28/3650 that prohibited human life in over 1,000 Kurdish villages.269 Prior to
this directive, the Kurds lawfully inhabited these areas for more than a
thousand years.270 Strictly interpreting “lawful” as national law where it would
allow dictators to legislate their way out of criminal conduct contradicts
principles in the Nuremburg Charter.271
As commander-in-chief of Iraq’s armed forces and as Chairman of the
RCC, Hussein condoned the deportation of over 400,000 Iraqi citizens
(including Kurds) holding valid Iraqi passports.272 Hussein’s personal
responsibility for the purges began with his accession to power in which he
deported or executed several Shi’ite clerics.273 Evidence exists to support
Hussein’s knowledge, both actual and constructive, of the forced deportation
of non-Arabs in Hussein’s Arabization campaign. United Nations Special
Rapporteur Max van der Stoel submitted numerous reports to the United
Nations that detailed instances of forced relocations and wrote various letters
to Hussein and the Iraqi government requesting evidence of cessation.274 If
nothing else, these letters put Hussein on notice of violations by subordinates.
Hence, his defense would have difficulty establishing his ignorance. The
discovery phase of any prosecution may uncover additional documents actually
signed by Hussein.
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2. Arbitrary and Severe Deprivation of Physical Liberty
The list of crimes against humanity does not end with Kurdish
deportation. Hussein also imprisoned Iraqi citizens and deprived them of their
physical liberty through arbitrary arrests, detentions, unfair trials, long prison
sentences, branding, amputation, and excessive use of the death penalty. The
ICTR, the ICTY, and the Allied Control Council Law No. 10 prohibit
excessive and unjust imprisonment in their instruments. Previous statutes
include the term “other severe deprivation of physical liberty.” This phrase has
emerged as a “catch all” provision for borderline types of confinement that
may not fit within other definitions but nonetheless rises to the level of a crime
against humanity. Article 9 of the ICCPR requires government to ensure
certain due process rights including prohibition against arbitrary arrests or
detentions, prompt information concerning charges, timely trials, and court
proceedings within a reasonable time.275 Similarly, Article 14 of the ICCPR
entitles everyone to a “fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and
impartial tribunal established by law.”276
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the ICTY
require the prosecutor to establish three general elements before convicting
Hussein for unlawfully imprisoning or severe depriving Iraqis of physical
liberty.277 First, the prosecutor must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
Hussein imprisoned or otherwise deprived one or more persons of their
physical liberty.278 Second, the prosecutor must establish that Hussein’s
conduct was severe enough to breach the fundamental rules of international
law by arbitrarily depriving the Kurds of their liberty.279 “Fundamental” refers
to the nature of the violation, not whether the accused complied with every
procedure available in international law.280 “Arbitrarily” means that no legal
basis can be invoked to justify the deprivation of liberty and that the individual
did not benefit from the due process of law.281 Third, the prosecutor must
prove that Hussein knew about the imprisonments and deprivations and was
aware of their severity.282 The ICTY interpreted this third element to mean “the
accused, or a person or persons for whom the accused bears criminal
responsibility [performed the act] with the intent to deprive the individual
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arbitrarily of his or her physical liberty or in the reasonable knowledge that is
act or omission is likely to cause arbitrary deprivation of physical liberty.”283
Despite signing the ICCPR,284 in which Iraq purports to guarantee its
citizens “a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial
tribunal established by law,”285 Hussein deprived a number of Iraqi citizens of
their due process rights in several ways. Little or no due process exists in Iraqi
courts.286 The government conducts trials in camera, before “special courts,”287
allows military officers and even civil servants (all of whom lack judicial
training and the necessary autonomy for impartial judgments) to preside over
trials,288 and often limits legal aid to the actual trial date.289
The prosecutor should be able to establish Hussein’s knowledge of the
deprivations of due process and resulting imprisonments. The families of
victims and officials from the United Nations sent letters directly to Saddam
Hussein and the Iraqi Government.290 These letters, combined with visits by
the United Nations Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights
provide evidence of Hussein’s knowledge. The Rapporteur may have based his
visit to Iraq, in part, on allegations of the lack of fair trials and the suppression
of freedom of expression and association.291 His report stated that the
Government of Iraq continued to disregard its obligations under Articles 9 and
14 of the ICCPR.292 These articles prohibit arbitrary arrest and detention as
well as entitle citizens to a fair and pubic hearing by a competent, independent
and impartial tribunal.293 The report expressed concern about long detentions
without charges, the lack of access to lawyers, non-public trials, death
sentences in absentia, and the lack of an appellate body to review decisions.294
3. “Other Inhumane Acts”: Excessive Punishments & Excessive Use of the
Death Penalty
The ICTR and ICTY prohibit acts that are inhumane in nature and
character that are not specifically included in their particular instruments, but
are “of comparable seriousness” and “comparable gravity” to the enumerated
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acts.295 As the ICTR noted in Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana,
“[t]hese will be acts or omissions that deliberately cause serious mental or
physical suffering or injury or constitute a serious attack on human dignity.296
The Prosecution must prove a nexus between the inhumane act and the great
suffering or serious injury to mental or physical health of the victim.”297 The
ICTI should determine whether an act constitutes an inhumane act “on a caseby-case basis.”298 In the ICTR, the inhumane act or omission must “(a) [b]e
directed against member(s) of the civilian population; (b) [t]he perpetrator
must have discriminated against the victim(s), on one or more of the
enumerated discriminatory grounds; (c) [t]he perpetrator’s act or omission
must form a part of a widespread or systematic attack and the perpetrator must
have knowledge of this attack.”299 In Prosecutor v. Kayishema and Ruzindana,
the ICTR acknowledged, “a third party could suffer serious mental harm by
witnessing acts committed against other, particularly against family or
friends.”300 The ICTR held that the defendant act of decapitation, castration,
and piercing a skull with a spike constituted “other inhumane acts” in
Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka.301
The ICTY’s interpretation of “other inhumane acts” varies slightly
from that of the ICTR. The tribunal in Prosecutor v. Vasilijevic required that
the prosecutor establish the following elements for “other inhumane acts:”
(i) the occurrence of an act or omission of similar
seriousness to the other enumerated acts under
the Article; (ii) the act or omission caused
serious mental or physical suffering or injury or
295
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constituted a serious attack on human dignity;
and (iii) the act or omission was performed
deliberately by the accused or a person or
persons for whose acts and omissions he bears
criminal responsibility.302
To assess the seriousness of an act, the tribunal should consider the factual
circumstances, the context in which the act or omission occurred, the personal
circumstances of the victim including his or her age, sex, and health, as well as
the physical, mental, and moral effects on the victim.303 The tribunal may also
consider the long-term effects of the act or omission on the victim.304
Hussein signed a number of decrees mandating branding and
amputations as punishments for Iraqi citizens.305 The tribunal may need to
consider each branding or amputation on a case-by-case basis, but may also
take Iraq’s other international obligations into consideration when determining
whether these acts constitute an inhumane act. Article 7 of the ICCPR, a
“fundamental” rule of law to which Iraq is a party, states, “[n]o one shall be
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.”306 Although the general comments to the ICCPR do not
explicitly list the treatments considered degrading, the comments forbid acts
that cause either mental or physical suffering. Branding and amputations would
most likely qualify as “excessive chastisement ordered as a punishment for a
crime or as an educative or disciplinary measure.”307 The ICCPR permits no
derogation from Article 7. Hussein, as the primary sponsor and promulgator
this punishment seems to have violated this treaty. Because Hussein signed the
decrees, the prosecutor should have little difficulty establishing Hussein’s
knowledge of the decrees and their potential effects on Iraqi citizens.
Consequently, the ICTI may convict him of “other inhumane acts.”
Saddam Hussein also signed an order instituting the death penalty for
all deserters and draft evaders and gave it retroactive application.308 This
retroactive application even contravenes the Iraqi Penal Code, which states in
Article 1, “[n]o act or omission shall be penalized except in accordance with a
legislative provision under which the said act or omission is regarded as a
criminal offense at the time of its occurrence.”309 Article 6(2) of the ICCPR
also forbids excessive use of the death penalty, and states “[i]n countries which
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have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only
for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of
the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present
Covenant.”310
These decrees promoting widespread use of the death penalty not only
conflict with fundamental rules of international law, but also violate Hussein’s
agreement under the ICCPR. The deprivation of life for minor offenses such as
theft, drug trafficking, and affiliation with political opposition, breach Article 6
of the ICCPR. Hussein’s signatures on the documents show that he not only
consented to the decrees, but also ordered them himself. The Special
Rapporteur’s reports and requests for additional information alerted Hussein to
the severity of the situation, yet Hussein refused to provide additional
information and actually issued more decrees. Although Hussein’s actions
breached Iraq’s treaties, for the ICTI to hold Hussein personally liable, these
breaches must constitute “other inhumane acts.” Like the analysis for branding
and amputations, the ICTI would need to examine the circumstances for each
instance in which Hussein’s officials actually carried out the death penalty for
minor violations on a case-by-case basis. The families of the victims will most
likely be able to fill in these details, and additional evidence may emerge
during the trial.
4. Torture
The ICTY,311 ICTR,312 and Allied Control Council Law No. 10 all
expressly list torture as a crime against humanity.313 Interestingly, neither the
Nuremberg nor the Tokyo Charters specified torture as a crime against
humanity, however, it would still have qualified as an “inhumane act.” Article
7(2)(e) of the Rome Statute defines “torture” as “the intentional infliction of
severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in custody
or under the control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions.”314
Furthermore, under the ICC, torture need not be carried out for a particular
purpose to constitute a crime against humanity.315 The absence of a need for a
particular purpose differs from requirements in the Torture Convention.316
Since Iraq is not a party to the Torture Convention, those principles would not
strictly apply. However, Iraq is a party to the ICCPR which states in Article 7,
“[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
310
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treatment or punishment.”317 The general comments to the ICCPR allow no
derogations or justifications from this article, which seems to make
government parties strictly liable.318
To convict Saddam Hussein of torture in a tribunal with a statute
similar to the Rome Statute, ICTY, or ICTR the prosecutor must meet several
elements. First, Hussein or his guards must have inflicted severe mental or
physical suffering on a person or persons in Hussein’s control or custody.319
Second, Hussein or his officials must have intended to inflict, by act or
omission the mental or physical pain.320 Finally, Hussein or his officials must
have aimed their actions or omissions “at obtaining information or a
confession, or at punishing, intimidating or coercing the victim or a third
person, or at discriminating on any ground, against the victim or a third
person.”321 Torture cannot have occurred only as a result of “lawful sanctions.”
No indication exists as to whether “lawful” refers to national or international
law. However, in order for this element to make any sense when applied to a
state actor such as Saddam Hussein, it must indicate international law.
The ICCPR’s 1992 general comments to Article 7 make clear Saddam
Hussein’s duty to the Iraqi people. They state in part, “[i]t is the duty of the
State party to afford everyone protection through legislative and other
measures as may be necessary against the acts prohibited in article 7, whether
inflicted by people acting in their official capacity, outside their official
317
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capacity or in a private capacity.”322 “The text of article 7 allows of no
limitation.”323 No justifications or extenuating circumstances may be used as
an excuse for any reason. In this regard, the Committee noted that “it is not
sufficient for the implementation of article 7 to prohibit such treatment or to
make it a crime.”324 The prohibition extends to acts that cause both physical
and mental suffering.325 It also extends to prolonged solitary confinement.326
Amnesties for committing torture do not comport with the duties in the
ICCPR, and contradict the duty of the States to investigate all such acts.327
By knowingly promoting and tolerating torture in Iraq, Hussein
violated his duty under the ICCPR, and the prosecutor could convict him under
the ICTY or ICTR statutes. In his official capacity, prisoners are effectively
under his control, and, under the ICCPR, no sanctions allowing torture may be
“lawful.” Thus, the ICTI may convict Hussein of torturing prisoners in an ad
hoc tribunal. Iraq may also face sanctions in a proceeding, possibly in the
International Court of Justice, that strictly determines Iraq’s compliance with
the ICCPR treaty.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all of the Iraqi citizens to begin a peaceful new government, they
should be allowed to participate in justice system that permits them to voice
their collective experiences before a knowledgeable judge. An ad hoc tribunal,
instituted by the United Nations Security Council’s Chapter VII power,
provides the best option for prosecuting Saddam Hussein and for promoting
reconciliation. Ensuring that Hussein receives a fair trial will set valuable legal
precedent for both the international and the Iraqi community. Justice brought
about by the ICTI should play an integral role in rebuilding Iraqi sovereignty
and in promoting a solid state of democracy after years of internal turmoil.
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